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Note
From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT
Standards Code's Prohibition on Unnecessary
Obstacles to Trade
The United States and the European Community (EC)' are
1. The 'European Community" is actually composed of three communi-
ties: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy
Community and the European Economic Community. J. GROUX & P. MANIN,
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 9 n.1 (1985). Sep-
arate treaties established these three communities, and their legal foundations
differ, but they have been organically united since their merger in 1967. I&
The European Communities no longer refer to themselves as separate bodies,
but prefer to call themselves the 'European Community." See Brimelow, The
dark side of 1992, FORBES, Jan. 22, 1990, at 85. This Note, therefore, will refer
to the European Communities as the "European Community" (EC).
The EC was established to aid in the reconstruction and revitalization of
war torn Europe by providing for an organized European political and eco-
nomic partnership. See generally P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLORAN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Co1,uNmEs 3 (2d ed. 1989)
(the post-war international political situation gave all the more impetus to a
political trend that "aimed at a firmly organised political and economic part-
nership of European nations"). European national markets were to be fused
through the establishment of a customs union, the abolishment of quantitative
trade obstacles within the EC, the facilitation of the free intra-union move-
ment of services, and the creation of a common agricultural policy. IHi at 14.
The Council of Ministers (Council) functions as the EC's legislative body
by adopting regulations and other acts developed by the Commission. J. JACK-
SON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONS
§ 4.2, at 200 (2d ed. 1986). The European Commission (Commission) is the
EC's equivalent of the United States executive branch. Id. The Commission
ensures that the EC members (Member States) observe the EC treaties and
implement the decisions of EC institutions. Id. The Commission also adminis-
ters EC programs, enforces regulations promulgated by the Council, and as-
sists in the development of new legislation that will be enacted by the Council.
Id The European Court of Justice serves as the EC's judicial branch, ensuring
the observance of EC law by regulating the actions of the EC and its Member
States and attempting to ensure that national courts interpreting EC law do so
in a uniform manner. P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLORAN VAN THEMAAT, supra, at
151.
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal
Republic of Germany (West Germany) created the EC in 1957 by signing the
Treaty of Rome, and thereby became the first six Member States. Treaty Es-
tablishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
11; J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra, § 4.2, at 199; P. KAPTEYN & P. VERLORAN
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currently embroiled in a dispute over the application of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code or
Code)2 to certain foodstuffs regulations. The EC has imposed a
temporary ban on the use of the naturally occurring growth
hormone, bovine somatotropic (BST).3 The ban is facially neu-
VAN THEMAAT, supra, at 16. A current reprint of the official text is published
in 1 TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIrIES 207 (1987) [herein-
after Treaty of Rome]. The EC presently has twelve Member States. J. JACK-
SON & W. DAVEY, supra, § 4.2, at 199. Effective January 1, 1973, the original
six Member States were joined by Denmark, Ireland, and the United King-
dom. 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 73) 3 (1972). In 1979, the nine Member States
agreed to admit Greece as the tenth member of the EC. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 291) 9 (1979). Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986. 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 302) 9 (1985). Turkey and Austria are currently pursuing mem-
bership. Elkes, Europe 1992: Its Impact on Nontariff Trade Barriers and
Trade Relations with the United States, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 563, 567
(1989).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Technical Barriers to
Trade, openedfor signature Apr. 12,1979,31 U.S.T. 405, T.LA.S. No. 9616,1186
U.N.T.S. 276 [hereinafter Standards Code or Code]. The Code is a separate
treaty from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signa-
ture Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I-.AS. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT]. The current version of
the GATT is published in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE (GATT/1986-4). A current reprint of the official text is published
in 4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1 (1969) [hereinafter
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS].
The Standards Code was finalized during the Tokyo Round of trade nego-
tiations within the GATT. Middleton, The GATT Standards Code, 14 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 201, 201 (1980). The Code became effective on January 1, 1980.
Standards Code, supra, art. 15, para- 6, 31 U.S.T. at 430, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 304.
The Standards Code was enacted by its members in an effort to reduce the
presence and effect of technical obstacles to trade. Comment, The United
States-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the Standards Code." Implications
for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade, 14 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 135, 139 (1989). The Code governs the regulation of all
products, including industrial and agricultural products. Standards Code,
supra, art. 1, para. 3, 31 U.S.T. at 414, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 278.
3. EC Commission Proposed Evaluation Period for Bovine Somatotropin
Use Through 1990, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 1201 (Sept. 20, 1989)
[hereinafter Proposed Evaluation Period]. BST is a bovine growth hormone
produced in the pituitary gland of all animals and is an important endocrine
factor for normal growth and milk production in cattle and other mammals.
Juskevich & Guyer, Bovine Growth Hornone" Human Food Safety Evalua-
tion, 249 SCIENCE 875, 875 (1990); Schneider, FDA Defends Milk-Producing
Drug in Study, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1990, at A18, col. 4 (nat'l ecL). BST is not
a steroid hormone and has no biological action in humans. OFFICE OF ECONOM-
ICS, INT'L TRADE COMM'N, UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MAY
BE HEADED FOR A NEW HORMONES DISPUTE, in INT'L ECON. REV. 3 (Sept. 1989)
[hereinafter HORMONES DISPUTE]. BST is nearly identical in chemical struc-
ture to the natural bovine growth hormone present in all milk, and milk from
a freshly calved heifer contains the hormone to a degree many times higher
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tral as its provisions apply to the use of BST inside the EC.4
Nonetheless, it could eventually have a disproportionate impact
upon United States farmers and producers who wish to export
their products to the EC and who could become far more de-
pendent on BST than their European counterparts.5 The
United States government has objected to the EC ban, arguing
that it is impermissible under the Standards Code as an unnec-
essary obstacle to trade.6
than that from a cow that has been treated with BST. Bloom, Veterinary
Chief Backs Milk-Boosting Hormone, Fin. Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at 32, col. 1
[hereinafter Bloom, Veterinary Chief]. Walter Beswick, president of the Brit-
ish Veterinary Association, defends BST as a natural product that simply en-
ables a cow to "reach maximum milking potential at minimum extra cost in
feed." Id.
BST treatment increases milk production by affecting several physiologi-
cal processes. Juskevich & Guyer, supra, at 875. Cattle injected with BST
generally experience increased mammary uptake of nutrients used for milk
synthesis and altered metabolism in their other tissues, which results in the
increased availability of nutrients for milk synthesis. I&i
Scientists have known since the 1930s that injecting dairy cattle with BST
increases their milk yields by up to 30%. I&; Proposed Evaluation Period,
supra, at 1201. Commercial use of BST was not economically feasible until the
advent of biotechnology in the last decade. Juskevich & Guyer, supra, at 875.
On September 13, 1989, the EC Commission proposed an 18 month delay
in the use of BST to allow for further evaluation of the product. Proposed
Evaluation Period, supra, at 1201. The proposed regulation became official EC
policy after it was formally proposed by the EC Commission, approved by each
of the EC Member States, reviewed and approved by the European Parlia-
ment, and adopted by the EC Council. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 116) 27
(1990); HORMONES DIsPuTE, supra, at 3-4; Proposed Evaluation Period, supra,
at 1201. The legislation provides that Member States must "prohibit the ad-
ministration of [BST] on their territory by any means whatsoever to dairy
cows." 33 O.J. EUR. COMm. (No. L 116) 27 (1990). The EC's actions effectively
ban both the EC's use of BST and the sale within the EC of dairy products
produced with the aid of BST. Bloom, No licencefor dairy hormone product,
Fin. Times, July 27, 1990, at 30, col. 4 [hereinafter Bloom, No licence].
The EC also banned the sale of all meat produced with the aid of steroid
growth hormones. 33 O.J. Eum COMM. (No. L 224) 29 (1990) (prohibiting the
use in livestock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action). The
EC believes that the hormones may pose a health hazard to consumers. Id As
the EC ban shut out $100 million of United States beef exports to the EC, the
United States retaliated against $100 million worth of EC products, which
ranged from fruit juices to pet food. U.S., ECNearing Accord on Partial Solu-
tion to Hormone Ban Dispute, U.S. Official Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep., No. 17, at
516 (Sept. 20, 1989). The U.S. retaliated by subjecting the EC products to an
additional 100% ad valorem tariff. I&. Negotiations to settle this trade dispute
are in progress. Elkes, supra note 1, at 585.
4. Bloom, No licence, supra note 3, at 30, col. 4.
5., Proposed Evaluation Period, supra note 3, at 1201.
6. Both former United States Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter
and United States Trade Representative Carla Hills believe that the ban is un-
1990]
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The BST trade dispute has generated a great deal of heated
debate, but has yet to be resolved.7 The difficulty that Code
analysts, those charged with adjudicating Standards Code dis-
putes, have had in resolving the dispute highlights a crucial
weakness in Standards Code adjudication: the lack of an ana-
lytical framework for determining when a technical trade regu-
lation violates the Standards Code.
This Note addresses the lack of a Standards Code frame-
work for determining whether a facially neutral regulation is
an impermissible obstacle to trade. Part I presents the BST
trade dispute and the difficulty analysts have encountered in
seeking its resolution.8 In the hope of crafting a model analyti-
cal framework for Code adjudication, Part H examines how
analogous disputes are resolved under the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution and the EC Treaty of Rome.9
Drawing upon the central premises of commerce clause and EC
jurisprudence, Part III proposes a model framework for resolv-
ing trade disputes under the Standards Code.10 Under this
framework, Code signatories that impose new technical obsta-
cles to trade would be required to prove that the barrier's net
costs to world trade do not exceed the net gains that the regu-
lating state will derive from imposing the new obstacle. For
the purposes of this test, a new barrier has a net benefit if it
serves the public interest in safety, quality, or effectiveness, and
if it uses narrowly tailored measures to effectuate its legitimate
purposes. This Note concludes that the EC's temporary ban on
BST fails this test.
I. THE STANDARDS CODE AND THE BST TRADE
DISPUTE
A. THE EC BAN ON BST
BST was the first product of gene-splicing biotechnology
that became available to farmers.1 Scientists discovered that
the introduction into a cow's bloodstream of tiny quantities of a
synthetically-produced duplicate of the bovine growth hormone
necessary and thus violative of the GATT Standards Code. HORMoNES DIS.
PUTE, supra note 3, at 3.
7. Bloom, No licence, supra note 3, at 30, col. 4.
8. See infra notes 11-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 47-109 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 110-48 and accompanying text.
11. Riskiess Hormone, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1990, § 4, at 12, col. 1;
Schmickle, New questions arise in old debate over bovine hormone for cows,
Minneapolis Star Tribune, Feb. 4, 1990, at 4B, col. 1.
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BST, a substance secreted by the glands of every dairy cow,
stimulates the cow to eat more fodder and produce more
milk.12 Tests conducted on several hundred cows injected with
BST demonstrated that the cows remained in good health,
yielded significantly more milk at a lower cost than untreated
cows, and behaved and reproduced normally in every way.13
The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) later
published a report that confirmed that consumption of dairy
products produced with the aid of BST poses no increased
health risk to the consumer.14
Nevertheless, the EC has banned the use of BST until the
end of 1990.15 The EC Commission claims that the ban will
give it time to develop and adopt new regulations governing the
authorization of veterinary medicinal substances such as BST.16
The Commission's real concerns do not relate to the safety of
BST,' 7 but rather that large, sophisticated dairy farmers will
12. Richardson, Biological Luddites Hold Back Progres Farmer's View-
point, Fi. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at 38, col. 5; see supra note 3.
13. Id.
14. Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 3, at 875. The FDA report was pub-
lished in SCIENCE. Id. The report concluded that BST is biologically inactive
in humans and, therefore, residues of it in food products would have no physi-
ological effect in humans, even if consumers of the dairy products were to ab-
sorb the substance intact from their gastrointestinal tracts. Id.; Schneider,
supra note 3, at A18, col. 4; Schmickle, Report FDA OK'd milk sales as safety
studies continue, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Aug. 24, 1990, at 6A, col. 1. The
FDA report described more than 120 studies submitted by the four American
producers of BST: Monsanto Agricultural, American Cyanamid, Eli Lilly, and
Upjohn. Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 3, at 877-83; Schneider, supra note 3,
at A18, col. 4. The producers' studies revealed that BST residues in milk were
within the range naturally found in milk produced without the aid of BST,
and that pasteurization destroyed 90% of the remaining BST. Juskevich &
Guyer, supra note 3, at 883; N.Y. Times, supra note 11, § 4, at 12, col. 2;
Schmickle, supra, at 6A, col. 1.
15. 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 116) 27 (1990); see supra note 3 and accom-
panying text.
16. 33 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 116) 27 (1990).
17. Id. The FDA insists that its studies demonstrate that humans may
safely consume milk that has been produced with the aid of BST. Juskevich &
Guyer, supra note 3, at 875; Schneider, supra note 3, at A18, col. 4; Schmickle,
FDA delays approving bovine drug for a year, Minneapolis Star Tribune, Apr.
24, 1990, at 7B, col. 5. The FDA's research is directed to determining BST's
effectiveness and its effect on cows. Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 3, at 875;
Schmickle, supra, at TB, col. 5. The FDA is required to consider these factors
in its determination of whether it should permit American farmers to continue
their use of BST. Juskevich & Guyer, supra note 3, at 875; Schmickle, supra,
at 7B, col. 5.
United States Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy
requested that the General Accounting Office investigate the FDA's review of
BST. Leahy Asks FDA Probe, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 1990, at A21, col. 1. Leahy's
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use BST to increase their yields and profits and exacerbate the
enormous surplus of dairy products produced by EC farmers,18
thus forcing more of the EC's remaining inefficient family
farmers 9 out of business.20 The United States government and
European dairy pharmaceutical industry officials believe that
such socioeconomic concerns have no place in marketing au-
thorization procedures that historically have been based en-
tirely on existing scientific evidence related to the product's
safety, quality, or effectiveness. 21 Thus, the United States gov-
request followed allegations from a former FDA veterinarian that the FDA fa-
vors animal-drug companies, ignored flaws in safety studies, and overlooked
harmful side effects to cows involved in the studies. I; Tolchin, F.D.A. Ac-
cused of Improper Ties in Review of Drug for Milk Cows, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1990, at A21, col. 1 (nat'l ed.); Schmickle, supra note 11, at 4B, col. 1. The four
United States producers of BST have invested more than $500 million in devel-
oping and producing the hormone. Schneider, supra note 3, at A18, col 4. De-
spite the controversy, the FDA allowed researchers to sell milk from
experimental herds in Minnesota and several other states. Juskevich &
Guyer, supra note 3, at 883 n.2; Schmickle, supra note 11, at 4B, col. 1; cf.
Tolchin, supra, at A21, col. 1 (several supermarket companies recently barred
sales of dairy products produced from the milk of cows treated with BST).
Such sales took place even though the FDA had not yet officially approved the
use of BST. Schmickle, supra, at 7B, col. 5; cf Schneider, supra note 3, at A18,
col. 4 (in 1985, the FDA approved the experimental use of BST in dairy herds
around the United States before it had finished evaluating BST's effect on
cows or had granted approval of the drug).
18. Powerful New Hormone Hovering Over United States-EC Trade Clash,
The Reuter Library Report, Jan. 31, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, wires file).
The EC even tried to reduce its surplus by slaughtering five-million dairy cat-
tle. Id. The EC also instituted internal quotas on the production of milk. Ban
on Genetically Engineered Hormone Could Set Precedent for Biotechnology, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, 997, 997 (July 26, 1989) [hereinafter Ban Could
Set Precedent].
19. Cf Europe's Farms Face Uncertain Future, United Press Int'l, Oct. 2,
1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, wires file) (the EC has witnessed a dramatic
shift to fewer and apparently larger farms, with the number of farmers declin-
ing from 15 million in 1957 to today's total of only 5.6 million).
20. Proposed Evaluation Period, supra note 3, at 1201. Small farmers may
still suffer from the introduction of BST even if it were to become available at
a relatively low cost because the use of BST may trigger milk surpluses, drive
down milk prices, and squeeze the least efficient farmers out of business. Ban
Could Set Precedent, supra note 18, at 997. Concerns over a possible milk sur-
plus and lower prices are exacerbated by fears that EC consumers may reduce
their purchases of milk if they begin to perceive that the dairy products are
not of a high quality. HoRmoNES DISPUTE, supra note 3, at 4. Such a con-
sumer scare could increase the already serious EC surplus in dairy products.
IcL; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (EC farmers are currently
experiencing a huge dairy surplus).
21. Proposed Evaluation Period, supra note 3, at 1201. A major complicat-
ing fact to the BST dispute is that the EC's actions are an attempt to supple-
ment the traditional Code criteria of safety, quality, and effectiveness with the
new socioeconomic criterion. Proposed Evaluation Period, supra note 3, at
[Vol. 75:505
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ernment opposes the ban,2 arguing that the ban is impermissi-
ble under the Standards Code as an unnecessary obstacle to
tradeze
B. ASCERTAINING THE EXISTENCE OF UNNECESSARY
OBSTACLES TO TRADE
The Standards Code was finalized in 1979 during the Tokyo
Round of trade negotiations24 within the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 5 The GATT is a series of inter-
1201; HORMONES DISPUTE, sujra note 3, at 4 (safety, quality, and effectiveness
are the three traditional criteria used to judge veterinary substances for use in
livestock). The socioeconomic criterion comprises the EC's primary justifica-
tion for the new obstacle. HoRMONEs DispuTE, supra note 3, at 4.
The EC has historically sought to increase the earnings of its family farm-
ers and stabilize its agricultural markets. Comment, United States/Common
Market Agricultural Trade and the GATT Framework, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 326, 338 (1983). The Treaty of Rome contains the philosophical underpin-
nings for these ideas. Id. Article 39(1) of the Treaty of Rome states that-
The objectives of the common agricultural policy shall be:
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical pro-
gress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural
production and the optimum utilization of the factors of-produc-
tion, in particular labour,
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural com-
munity, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of per-
sons engaged in agriculture;
(c) to stabilize markets;
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; [and]
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 39(1), at 254-55. Indeed, the EC itself was
designed, in part, to increase farm income and to stabilize the agricultural
markets. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY,
98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TRADE PoLIcY PERSPECTIVES: SETTING THE STAGE FOR
1985 AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter TRADE
PoucY PERSPECTIVES]. The EC uses export subsidies to promote the export of
agricultural products. Comment, supra, at 338-39 (although the EC's common
agricultural policy ignores the GA'T limitations on the use of export subsi-
dies, the EC makes little effort to hide such GATT violations).
22. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. United States officials are
concerned that proposals such as the BST ban could dampen both the future
study in biotechnological areas and the implementation of findings that result
from the studies. HORMONES DISPUTE, supra note 3, at 3-4.
23. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24. Middleton, supra note 2, at 201. The beginning of the slow process to-
wards regulating international agricultural trade began during the Tokyo
Round negotiations of the mid-1960s. Comment, supra note 21, at 328.
Although the GA'IT's formal provisions apply equally to the agricultural, in-
dustrial, and manufacturing sectors, its signatories initially focused most of
their attentions on reducing trade obstacles within the world's industrial and
manufacturing sectors. 1d.
25. See supra note 2.
1990]
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national trade agreements and protocols.26 The GATT's Gen-
eral Articles describe the basic trade policy commitments of the
GATT signatories (Contracting Parties).27 Essentially, these
26. The GATT emerged out of the devastation resulting from World War
11 and was designed to promote international understanding and interdepen-
dence through international monetary and trade transactions. J. JACKSON &
W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 294-95 (the GATT became the central organi-
zation for coordinating national policies on international trade even though it
was merely supposed to embody both the results of tariff negotiations and
some general protective clauses designed to prevent its signatories from evad-
ing these tariff commitments).
The GATT is one of the central organizations for coordinating world trade
policies, although it was never intended to become the central international
trade organization. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 251-52 (1967). The GATT is
frequently utilized by its signatories (Contracting Parties) to reduce the quan-
tity and significance of obstacles to international trade. J. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GA IT § 10.9, at 248 (1969).
A large, informal, international organization, also known as "the GATT,"
administers the rules of the GATT agreement. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settle-
ment After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.
REV. 145, 147 & n.3 (1980) (the Contracting Parties have all powers of adminis-
tration; they act as a collective entity and, by decision, practice, and tradition,
the Parties have constructed a large organization with many branches, headed
by the executive GATT' Council). One of the primary functions of the GATT'
organization is to provide for ad hoc consultations on issues that are of concern
to any of the Contracting Parties. Id. at 147. Third-party adjudication is relied
on when the consultations fail to resolve disputes. Id- (the panel procedure is
used for third-party adjudication of legal claims).
27. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, preamble, at 1; J. JACKSON
& W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 296. In addition to the 96 Contracting Par-
ties, about 30 other nations participate in the work of the GATIT Hudec, Re-
forming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1444 n.2 (1988). While most of the GATT's 23 original
Contracting Parties can be classified as developed Western market economies,
well over two-thirds of today's signatories belong to the third world. Jackson,
The Changing International Law Framework for E"ports. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, 14 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 505, 511 (1984).
The United States is a signatory both to the GATT and the Standards
Code. GA7TI, BASIC INsTRuMENTs, supra note 2, at 1; Standards Code, supra
note 3, 31 U.S.T. at 405, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 276. The GATT Contracting Parties
accept the EC as a representative that has power to negotiate on behalf of its
Member States and as a party to various GATT agreements. Note, The Status
of GATT in Community Law, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 337, 337 (1981). In 1972,
the EC became a de facto GATT Contracting Party with the right both to
speak and to table proposals and amendments in its own name. International
Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap Voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1221, 1227, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8194, at
8,614; J. GROUX & P. MANIN, supra note 1, at 52-53 (on December 12, 1972, the
European Court of Justice recognized that the EC had succeeded its Member
States in the exercise of the GATT responsibilities). The EC has not formally
replaced its Member States as GATT Contracting Parties. I& at 52. The EC,
however, has assumed most of its Member States' functions that relate to
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Parties agree not to raise tariffse or impose other obstacles29
on any of the commodities listed on their GATT tariff
schedules.30
According to the national treatment obligations of GATT
Article 1I, regulatory measures "should not be applied to im-
ported or domestic products so as to qfford protection to domes-
tic production."3' Thus, a trade regulation generally will not
GATT matters. I&. Provisions of the GATT have legal force both in interna-
tional and United States domestic law. See generally Jackson, supra note 26,
pasim (the GATT is directly applicable to state and local government in the
United States and supersedes state and local law when such laws are not auto-
matically pre-empted by federal law).
28. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, preamble, art. H, at 1, 3-5.
Tariffs are taxes imposed on imported goods at a nation's border. J. JACKSON
& W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 364.
29. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENS, supra note 2, art. XI, at 17-18. Tariffs are
the most basic and simple obstacle to international trade, but nontariff barri-
ers may also be utilized by countries in order to place restrictions upon the
flow of imports. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 364. The
quota, or quantitative restriction, is but one of hundreds, if not thousands, of
different types of nontariff barriers. I& A quota is a quantitative restriction
on a particular good that a country will allow to be imported. Quotas may be
"global," in that they apply to the total amount of the specified good from all
origins or sources. I&L "Country" quotas allow only a certain quantity from
specified countries. I&
30. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENrs, supra note 2, art. 2, at 3-5; see also J.
JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 296-97 (for each commodity listed
on a Contracting Party's schedule, that nation agrees not to charge a tariff that
will exceed the amount specified in the schedule). The GATT operates by re-
ducing or eliminating tariff obstacles and by liberalizing international trade re-
lations between its Contracting Parties. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARiF AND TRADE, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTI-
LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF GAT
18 (1979). The GAT discourages, but does not actually bar, the use of tariffs.
GAT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, preamble, at 1. GATT Article XI,
however, generally prohibits the use of measures that operate as quantitative
restrictions. I&i art. XI, para. 1, at 17. With a few exceptions, the remainder of
the GATT reinforces its tariff obligations. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra
note 1, § 5.4, at 296-97.
31. GATr, BASic INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, art. M, para- 1, at 6 (empha-
sis added). Article H, paragraph 1 reads, in part: 'The [C]ontracting [P]arties
recognize that internal... regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase .... or use of products .... should not be ap-
plied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production." I&. The Article I national treatment obligation is clarified by
Article H, paragraph 4, which reads in part: '"The products of the territory of
any [C]ontracting [P]arty ... shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase,... or use." Id para. 4, at 6. The drafters of Article HI intended to
cover not only legislation that directly governed the conditions of sale or
purchase but also any legislation that could indirectly modify the competitive
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violate Article III if it applies equally3 2 to domestic and im-
ported goods.3s Because of this limitation, Article III is largely
ineffective against unnecessary technical obstacles to trade -
obstacles that are facially neutral yet discriminatory in their
effect.s 4
The Standards Codeas - one of several "side agreements"
to the GATT - addresses this problem.36 The Code signatories
conditions that would exist between the domestic and imported products. Ital-
san Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, GATT 7th
Supp. Basic Instruments & Selected Documents 60 (1959). This goal is re-
flected in GAIT annex I, ad Article III:
Amy... law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in [Ar-
ticle III] paragraph 1 which applies to an imported product and to the
like domestic product and is . .. enforced in the case of the imported
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be re-
garded as an internal... law, regulation or requirement of the kind
referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the provisions
of Article M.
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, annex I, ad art. I, at 63.
32. Akehurst, Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities During 1978, 50 BRT. Y.B. INT'L L., 273, 278 (1981). The GATT does not
require that the Contracting Parties treat imported and domestic goods in an
identical fashion. Id Indeed, similar treatment of dissimilar products can op-
erate to create disproportionate obstacles as surely as differential treatment of
similar cases. Id. at 278. The principle of proportionality simply "requires that
similar situations shall not be treated differently." Royal Scholten-Honig
(Holdings) Ltd. v. Intervention Bd. for Agricultural Produce, 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2037, 2072, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH)
8486 at 8,745 (emphasis added).
33. One can infer from the "no less favourable" language of Article I,
paragraph 4 that the Contracting Parties are prohibited from favoring domes-
tic products but, at the same time, are free to treat domestic products differ-
ently than imported products. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
Annex I, ad Article III provides an example of such different yet equal treat-
ment. GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, annex I, ad art. Ill, at 63.
Under this provision, a Contracting Party may impose border regulations or
requirements on imported goods if the Party imposes similar regulations or re-
quirements on domestic goods. Id.
34. Middleton, supra note 2, at 201. Technical obstacles to trade comprise
some of the most complex and numerous of nontariff obstacles to trade. Id
These obstacles generally apply similarly to imported and domestic goods and
are thus not overtly violative of the GATT Article Ill national treatment obli-
gation. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 1, § 8.5, at 532-33. As a result, the
obstacles were, previous to the inception of the Standards Code, subject to vir-
tually no GATT Article III or any other multilateral supervision. Middleton,
supra note 2, at 201-02.
35. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Provisions of the Code bind
only its individual signatories. Standards Code, supra note 3, art. 15, para. 6, 31
U.S.T. at 430, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 304; Middleton, supra note 2, at 201.
36. Comment, supra note 2, at 138-39. The Standards Code governs regu-
lations that impose technical specifications because such regulations act as
technical barriers to international trade of agricultural and other products. Id
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agree to refrain from adopting future37 technical regulationsws
and standards9 that create unnecessary trade obstacles.4°
Under the Code, however, it is the exporting party that has the
burden of proving that the regulating party imposed the techni-
cal regulation for protectionist reasons, or that the terms or ef-
fect of the measure are unduly burdensome and thus
unnecessary.
4
If a party to the Code enacts a regulation or a standard that
creates, in the words of the Code, an "unnecessary obstacle to
international trade,"42 then an aggrieved Standards Code signa-
tory may resort to the Code's consultation and dispute settle-
ment provisions.4 The Code, however, neither defines the
37. The Standards Code generally applies prospectively to regulations or
standards that were enacted after January 1, 1980. Standards Code, supra note
2, art. 2, paras. 5-7, 31 U.S.T. at 415-16, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 280-82 & art. 15, para.
6, 31 U.S.T. at 430, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 304.
38. Technical regulations are technical specifications with which import-
ers must comply. Standards Code, supra note 2, annex 1, para. 2, 31 U.S.T. at
433, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 308.
39. Id para- 3, 31 U.S.T. at 433, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 308. Standards are non-
mandatory technical specifications that are approved by a recognized standard-
izing body. Id.
40. Id. para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 433, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 308; Eicher, Technical I
Regulations and Standards, in THE URUGUAY ROUND: A HANDBOOK ON THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGoTIATIoNs 137, 140 (1987). Government documents
normally contain these regulations and standards that specify the required
characteristics of products, including quality levels or specifications that relate
to performance, safety, or dimensions. Standards Code, supra note 2, annex 1,
para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 433, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 308. Process and production method
requirements or, in the words of the Code, "codes of practice," are not subject
to the provisions of the Standards Code. Id. The strength of the Code is di-
minished because its terms only regulate product characteristics, and not pro-
cess and production methods.
41. Standards Code, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 414, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 278-80.
42. I&
43. Id. art. 14, 31 U.S.T. at 426-29, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 298-304. The descrip-
tive term of dispute settlement is "a nice sort of nonadversarial, nonthreaten-
ing, look-at-the-positive-side phrase for what most people would call a
lawsuit." Hudec, 'Transcending the Ostensible":- Some Reflections on the Na-
ture of Litigation Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1987). At
the conclusion of the dispute settlement investigation process, an aggrieved
party may be able to suspend appropriate obligations, in respect of the other
party or parties, under the Code. Standards Code, supra note 2, art. 14, para.
21, 31 U.S.T. at 428, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 302. This suspension of obligations is
designed to "restore mutual economic advantage and balance of rights and ob-
ligations." Hudec, supra, at 214. It is unlikely, however, that any signatory
will ever suspend its obligations after the occurrence of an alleged Code viola-
tion. I&. at 215.
Unfortunately, recent battles between the United States and the emerging
EC have led to increased levels of resistance to Standards Code adjudicatory
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term "unnecessary,""4 nor provides Code analysts with a frame-
rulings. I& Much of this resistance is due to the nature of the GATI"s provi-
sions, which are too weak to effectively counteract the strong political pres-
sures within the EC that advocate the support of high agricultural prices and,
therefore, overproduction by European farmers. Id- at 215-16.
Aggrieved Code signatories initially attempt to reach a resolution through
consultation. Standards Code, suprm note 2, art. 14, paras. 1-2, 31 U.S.T. at 426,
1186 U.N.T.S. at 298. A signatory to the Code may invoke the right to consul-
tation whenever it believes that another signatory is interfering with any ben-
efit to which it is entitled under the agreement. I&. If consultation fails,
either party may request that the matter be examined by the Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade. Id arts. 13-14, 31 U.S.T. at 425-29, 1186 U.N.T.S.
at 298-304.
A Standards Code committee is composed of representatives from each of
the Standards Code signatories. I& art. 13, para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 425, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 298. The committee meets at least once a year to provide Code sig-
natories with the opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to the op-
eration of the Code or furthering its objectives. I
The committee will create a technical expert group if it cannot propose a
mutually satisfactory solution within three months and if one of the parties to
the dispute "considers the issues to relate to questions of a technical nature."
Id art. 14, para. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 427, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 300. The committee may
call upon technical expert groups to provide panels with reports in the event
that the committee must consider issues that involve questions of a technical
nature. IM. art. 14, para. 17, 31 U.S.T. at 428, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 302. A technical
expert group examines the matter, consults with the parties in an effort to
reach a mutually satisfactory solution, makes a statement concerning the facts
of the dispute, and, if so directed by the committee, makes findings "concern-
ing the detailed scientific judgments involved, whether the measure was neces-
sary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, and whether a
legitimate scientific judgment is involved." IM. para. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 427, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 300. The agreement encourages technical expert groups to accom-
plish their objectives within a six month time frame. I& para. 11, 31 U.S.T. at
427, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 300.
Panels are created by the committee in the event that no mutually satis-
factory solution has been reached within three months of the beginning of the
committee investigation and no technical expert group has been created. Id
para. 14, 31 U.S.T. at 427, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 300. The GATT panels function in a
manner that is quite similar to appellate tribunals in the United States.
Hudec, supra, at 213. The parties to the dispute present their arguments in
both oral and written form. Id In order to facilitate the committee in making
recommendations or giving rulings on a matter, the panels examine the mat-
ter, consult with the disputing parties in an attempt to reach a settlement,
make a statement concerning the facts of the matter, and make such findings
as the committee requests. Standards Code, supra note 2, art. 14, para. 15., 31
U.S.T. at 427-28, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 300-02. The agreement encourages panels to
deliver their findings within four months from the date that they were estab-
lished. IM. para. 18, 31 U.S.T. at 428, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 302.
44. The Code, however, does define such terms as "technical specifica-
tion," "technical regulation," "standard," "international body or system," "re-
gional body or system," "central government body," "local government body,"
"non-governmental body," "standardizing body," and "international standard."
Standards Code, supr note 2, annex 1, paras. 1-10, 31 U.S.T. at 433-35, 1186
U.N.T.S. at 308-10.
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work for determining whether a technical obstacle to trade is
"unnecessary" and thus impermissible.4
The EC's temporary ban on selling and importing dairy
products derived from animals treated with BST constitutes a
technical barrier to international trade that is, in the opinion of
the United States, unnecessary and therefore violative of the
GATT Standards Code.46 Resolution of the BST controversy
depends, then, on the proper interpretation of the Standards
Code - the GATT agreement drafted to deal with technical
barriers to trade. Part II of this Note considers the central
premise of the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion and internal EC jurisprudence as a starting point to craft-
ing an analytical framework for evaluating technical barriers to
trade under the GATT Standards Code.
II. FREE TRADE JURISPRUDENCE WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EC
A. UNITED STATES INTERSTATE COMMERCE JURISPRUDENCE
Shortly after World War II and just before the birth of the
GATT, the United States Supreme Court decided two interstate
transportation cases that explicitly set out the analytical frame-
work that United States courts should follow when determin-
ing whether a facially neutral, state-imposed trade obstacle
conflicts with the commerce clause.47 In Southern Pacifi Co.
v. Arizona,4 the Court struck down a state law that imposed
limits on the length of trains operated within the state.49 The
45. See Middleton, supra note 2, at 206.
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (United States officials be-
lieve that the ban is unnecessary and thus violative of the Standards Code);
Dunne, Yeutter Applauds EC's Caution on Dairy Hormone, Fin. Times, Sept.
15, 1989, at 42, col. 1. Nevertheless, former United States Secretary of Agricul-
ture Clayton Yeutter praised the EC's temporary ban as an effort to allow the
EC to conduct further scientific studies of BST. Id. Yeutter, in praising the
EC's decision only to temporarily ban BST, appeared to be motivated by fear
that the EC might employ non-scientific grounds to impose a permanent ban
on the first major biotechnology product that pharmaceutical companies have
attempted to sell. Buchan, Brussels Seeks Dairy Hormone Moratorium, Fin.
Times, Sept. 14, 1989, at 46, col. 1.
47. The United States Constitution specifically grants Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The purpose of
the commerce clause is to prevent any state from successfully gaining an eco-
nomic advantage at the expense of another state. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-39 (1949); Stern, The Problems of Yesteryear - Com-
merce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv. 446, 456 (1951).
48. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
49. Id at 763.
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Southern Paclfw Court held that states lack the authority to
substantially impede interstate commerce;5s securing national
uniformity in the operation of the railroads outweighed the
states' interest in limiting the length of trains.5 ' In Morgan v.
Virginia,5 2 the Court struck down a state law that mandated
the racial segregation of passenger buses operated within the
state.as The Morgan Court held that "state legislation is invalid
if it unduly burdens [interstate] commerce in matters where
uniformity is necessary."5 4
In both cases, the United States Supreme Court applied a
balancing test to decide if national interests in the unhampered
operation of interstate commerce outweighed state interests. 8
Yet neither case suggested which standard of review courts
should apply in determining whether a state regulation imper-
missibly burdens interstate commerce.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of burden of proof in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison.8 The
Court held that courts should uphold obstacles to interstate
trade only if the regulation is nondiscriminatory and it imposes
the least restrictive burdens on interstate trade.5 7 In Dean
Milk, a municipality prohibited the sale of non-locally pasteur-
ized milk.58 The ordinance, although parlaying favors upon lo-
cal pasteurizers, helped to ensure the safety of the local milk
supply by simplifying health department inspections of the pas-
teurizers.5 9 The Court noted that the ordinance did not conflict
with any federal legislation and that the subject matter lay
within the sphere of state regulation even if the resulting legis-
50. Id. at 767.
51. IM at 773.
52. 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
53. Id, at 374.
54. Id, at 377.
55. See Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 767, 773; Morgan, 328 U.S. at 377. By
virtue of the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, a federal law enacted
under the commerce clause controls if it is inconsistent with a state law. J.
NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITruIONAL LAW § 8.1, at 260 (3d ed.
1986). States still have some power to directly or indirectly regulate interstate
commerce. Stern, supra note 47, at 451-60. When the national interest in the
commerce is sufficiently great, however, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently prohibited states from burdening interstate commerce. Id.
56. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
57. Id. at 354-56.
58. Id at 350. Dean Milk pasteurized its milk outside of Madison's restric-
tive mileage limitation. Id at 352. Dean Milk distributed milk and milk prod-
ucts within Illinois and Wisconsin. I&. at 351.
59. Id. at 352.
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lation imposed burdens upon interstate commerce.60 The Court
held, however, that the health related ordinance was an unnec-
essary trade obstacle 6 ' because less burdensome means existed
to safeguard the city's supply of milk.6 2 For instance, the Court
suggested that the ordinance could have required non-local pas-
teurizers to reimburse the city for any inspection costs or that
the city could have required non-local officials to perform ex-
pensive inspections.63
As a result of Southern Pacigf, Morgan, and Dean Milk,
United States courts uphold state legislation that imposes inter-
state trade barriers only when the legislation serves the public
interest in safety, quality, or effectiveness, and when the legis-
lation is narrowly tailored to effectuate the barrier's legitimate
purposes.6 This tremendous bias of United States courts to-
wards free trade between the states is mirrored by the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Justice, which has repeatedly
imposed similar requirements on members of the EC attempt-
ing to impose barriers to trade within the EC.65
B. EC TREATY OF ROME HEALTH AND LIFE EXCEPTIONS
Created and governed by the 1957 Treaty of Rome,6 the
EC is becoming a superstate67 as the economic and political sys-
60. Id at 353-54.
61. Id. at 354.
62. I& at 354-56.
63. I&
64. E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 139, 143 (1970) (citations
omitted). This formulation implicitly sets forth a free trade balancing test.
Under this analytical test, United States courts weigh the rights and interests
of the disputing parties to decide whether the importance of the sought after
benefit justifies the imposition on free trade. Generally, state legislation vio-
lates the commerce clause if it either conflicts with a national economic policy
or a valid federal law. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728-29 (1949); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945); Powell, The Still Small Voice of
the Commerce Clause, in 3 A.A.L.S., SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 931, 932 (D. Maggs ed. 1938).
65. See infra notes 76-109 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
67. Brimelow, supra note 1, at 86. The view of the EC emerging as a
superstate is supported by Jacques Delors, a French socialist who heads the
EC Commission. IH. The European population of nearly 320 million is sched-
uled to form the world's most populace, and perhaps most muscular, economic
unit by the end of 1992. Elkes, supra note 1, at 563. This massive population
base is intended to match the strengths of the United States and Japan. Kirk-
land, Outsider's Guide to Europe in 1992, FORTUNE, Oct. 24, 1988, at 121-22. In-
deed, Europe's population base will almost equal the combined total of the 220
million people living in the United States and the 120 million people living in
Japan. Elkes, supra note 1, at 569.
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tems of much of Europe unify.68 One of the primary goals of
the EC is to remove intra-European Community obstacles to
trade.69 As with the United States commerce clause, an entire
body of jurisprudence has evolved that delineates the ability of
Treaty of Rome signatories (Member States) to impose barriers
to free trade within the EC.
EC Treaty of Rome Article 30 prohibits Member States
from imposing import quotas on goods that are lawfully pro-
68. Brimelow, supra note 1, at 85-86. The 1986 Single European Act calls
for a completely integrated Internal Market by December 31, 1992. 30 O.J.
Eu Comm. (No. L 169) 1 (1987). This integration should harmonize the vir-
tual maze of existing nontariff trade obstacles. Elkes, supra note 1, at 571.
Jacques Delors, see supra note 67, believes that by 1998 the Commission will
be responsible for no less than 80% of Europe's microeconomic legislation.
Brimelow, supra note 1, at 86.
The effect of the Single European Act worries many Americans who fear
that the lifting of nontariff trade obstacles between EC Member States will
only accelerate the increasingly serious and frequent occurrences of trade dis-
putes that are already erupting between the EC and the United States. Elkes,
supra note 1, at 564. Such fears may be warranted by some evidence of spiral-
ing tensions between EC Member States and the United States. For example,
in an advertisement created by the French government, a "skinny French
boxer is squaring off to battle a giant American football player and a menacing
Japanese sumo wrestler. Suddenly eleven buddies - the rest of the [EC,] of
course - rush to his side, and the aggressors turn away." Kirkland, supra
note 67, at 121-22.
The United States has historically supported the plans to eliminate all
economic barriers within the EC by 1992. Brimelow, supra note 1, at 85. Nev-
ertheless, some Americans have recently questioned such supportive senti-
ments due to growing concerns that the proposed "European superstate one
day could emerge as a protectionist, corporatist, anti-American Frankenstein."
Id The recognition that the EC has refused to pay for its own defense and
that Britain has been unable to block French and German protectionist ten-
dencies compound these concerns. Id. at 89. The EC's political integration
could result in a protectionist and highly regulated, and therefore high-cost,
superstate. Id
69. Comment, supmr note 21, at 338. The central feature of the EC is the
customs union that is created by removing all duties and obstacles to trade
that exist between Member States and adopting a common tariff for imports
from the rest of the world. TRADE POLICY PERsPECtiVES, supra note 21, at
323-28. All EC nations will operate with common regulations on standards of
composition, packaging, labeling requirements, and industrial codes of practice.
Elkes, supra note 1, at 571. To counteract the wide variety of national stan-
dards for food products, Member States must not impose obstacles to products
licensed for sale in at least one other Member State. I&
Another example of the rapid centralization can be seen in the ongoing
struggle by the Commission to force the Member States to harmonize their
value-added taxes. Brimelow, supra note 1, at 86. This tax harmonization is
particularly striking when one compares the experience in the United States,
where each state determines the types and levels of taxes that its citizens shall
pay. Id
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duced and marketed within other Member States.70 Article 36
provides several exceptions to this general rule. Under Article
36, a Member State may create those obstacles to intra-Euro-
pean Community trade that are necessary for "the protection of
human or animal life or health."71
70. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 30, at 244 (Member States may not
impose quantitative restrictions on goods imported from other EC states).
71. Id art. 36, at 248. Article 36 provides that-
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 [generally forbidding quantitative
restrictions on trade between EC Member States] shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit jus-
tified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security,
the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeo-
logical value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property.
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.
Id,
Article XX is the GA T's equivalent to the Treaty of Rome Article 36
general exceptions provision. Article XX contains a series of exceptions that
may be the most troublesome and most subject to abuse of all of the excep-
tions to the general prohibition against the use of new trade obstacles. J.
JACKSON, supra note 26, § 28.1, at 741. One example is the Article XX(b)
health protection exception, which allows a Contracting Party to establish a
partial or complete prohibition on the importation of a product if that nation
can demonstrate that the product poses a threat to the life or health of
humans, animals, or plants. GATT, BASIC INsmuMmNs, supra note 2, art.
XX(b), at 37. If a Contracting Party can demonstrate that the consumption of
the product would pose a danger to human, animal, or plant health, and the
resulting protective quantitative barriers are administered in a non-discrimina-
tory fashion, the barriers would probably be deemed to be permissible under
Article XX(b). Id.; see Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized
Countries: International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the
GATT, 70 M cH. L. REv. 859, 892 (1972). Article XX does not apply to the BST
controversy because the EC's proposed ban would apply both to domestic and
imported goods, thereby satisfying the GATT Article HI national treatment
obligation. See GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS, supra note 2, art. H, at 6-7. The
Article XX general exceptions would only be utilized if the ban were applied
against imported, and not domestic, dairy products. Id. art. XX, at 37-38. Arti-
cle XX reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any [C]ontracting [P]arty of measures ... necessary to protect pub-
lic morals; ... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; [or other specified matters that relate to intellectual property,
prison labor, national treasures, exhaustible natural resources, inter-
governmental commodity agreements, domestic materials that are
necessary to a domestic processing industry, or products that are in
general or local short supply].
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Read together, Articles 30 and 36 implicitly create an EC
free trade balancing test. The European Court of Justice 2 will
strike down an intra-European Community obstacle to trade
unless the grounds for imposing the barrier are legally justified,
such as being necessary for the protection of human or animal
Id. The general exceptions to the Standards Code are set forth in its
preamble:
No [Standards Code signatory] should be prevented from taking meas-
ures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protec-
tion of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or
for the prevention of deceptive practices, subject to the requirement
that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between [signatories]
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade ....
Standards Code, supra note 2, preamble, 31 U.S.T. at 413, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 278.
72. The European Court of Justice holds the real power within the EC be-
cause its rulings bind the Member States and consistently go beyond the letter
of the law to further European integration. Brimelow, supra note 1, at 85.
The Court ensures the observance of EC law in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Treaty of Rome and its implementing rules. See infra notes 73-74
and accompanying text. The Court settles disputes, issues binding opinions,
and provides preliminary rulings by interpreting and applying EC law. P.
KAPrEYN & P. VERLORAN VAN THEMAAT, supra note 1, at 151 (EC law has ex-
pressly conferred on the European Court of Justice a number of powers that
enable the Court to judge the acts and omissions of the EC institutions and the
Member States in accordance with EC law and to ensure that national courts
uniformly interpret and apply EC law). A Member State must take the neces-
sary measures to comply with the Court's judgment if the State's actions or
rules are inconsistent with provisions of the EC Treaty of Rome. See, e.g.,
Procureur De La Republique v. Waterkeyn, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4337,
4360-61, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8889, at 8,486
(holding that if the European Court of Justice determines that a Member
State's legislation is incompatible with the obligations that the Member State
has under the Treaty of Rome, the Member State's national courts must draw
the necessary inferences from the judgment of the European Court of Justice);
see also Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 171, at 375 (decisions of the Court
are binding on the Member States).
The EC litigation process more closely resembles the United States judi-
cial system than does the Standards Code consultation and dispute settlement
adjudicatory committees, expert groups, or panels. See supra note 43 and ac-
companying text. The EC Commission and the EC Council may use the Euro-
pean Court of Justice to sue a Member State. J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra
note 1, § 4.2, at 202. Similarly, Member States may sue each other. Id Ag-
grieved EC Member States may file suit over alleged violations of obligations
that arise under the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 169-
71, at 374-75.
If such a dispute arises between Member States, the States provide their
comments and pleadings to the Commission. I& art. 170, at 374. The Commis-
sion then returns an opinion to the parties. Id If one or more of the Member
States refuse to comply with the opinion, the Commission or a Member State
may refer the matter to the Court of Justice. Id
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life or health.73 Member States that impose Article 36 trade ob-
stacles have the burden of demonstrating74 that the enacted
barriers serve the public interest in safety, quality, or effective-
ness, and employ the least restrictive means necessary to effec-
tuate the regulation's legitimate purposes.75
73. See, eg., Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ffir Brannt-
wein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, 663-64, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543, at 7,784.
74. The EC Commission, which often acts as the plaintiff in Article 30 liti-
gation, normally has the burden of proving that a Member State did not fulfill
a Treaty of Rome obligation due to the nation's alleged breach of Article 30 of
the EC Treaty of Rome. Brealey, The Burden of Proof Before the European
Court, 10 EuP. L. REv. 250, 256 (1985). In contrast to Article 30 cases, in litiga-
tion under Article 36, the regulating nation has the onus of establishing that
one of the Article 36 exceptions justifies the national legislation. Criminal
Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2445, 2464, [1983-
1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,006, at 14,092-93; Com-
mission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 531, 550-51, [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8905, at 8,637. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice strictly interprets Article 36. D. WYATr & A.
DAsHwooD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 138 (2d ed. 1987).
The burden of proof in EC Article 36 cases is similar to the burden con-
tained in United States commerce clause cases. See supra notes 47-64 and ac-
companying text. The burden in GAT Standards Code cases, however, lies
not with the signatory that established the obstacle, but with the non-regulat-
ing party. See Middleton, supra note 2, at 206.
75. See infra notes 76-105 and accompanying text. A related element that
the European Court of Justice occasionally analyzes is whether the facially
neutral regulation impacts disproportionately on imported goods in a manner
that affords protection to domestically produced goods. See, e.g., Commission
v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2299, 2316-17, [1979-1981 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 8591, at 8,273. This element is not
central to the BST dispute, although certainly relevant within the context of
EC litigation, because the element's requirement of proportionality is more
than adequately addressed by the GATT Article m national treatment obliga-
tion. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
French Republic illustrates EC proportionality litigation. The Commission
charged France with having violated the provisions of Article 30 by subjecting
the advertising of certain alcoholic beverages to discriminatory rules. French
Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2311-12, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8,721. French legislation divided both alcoholic
and non-alcoholic beverages into five groups. I& The first group consisted of
non-alcoholic beverages. Id Groups two through three were comprised of dif-
ferent categories of alcoholic beverages, while the fifth group consisted of all
the alcoholic beverages not expressly contained in groups two through four.
Ii The legislation prohibited advertising any of the group five alcoholic bev-
erages. d at 2313, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
8,721. The legislation placed no advertising restrictions on groups two and
four. fI It placed some restrictions on group three. Id This third group in-
cluded certain natural sweet wines, liqueur wines, wine-based aperitifs, and
strawberry, raspberry, blackcurrant, or cherry liqueurs that did not exceed a
fixed amount of pure alcohol. Id. at 2312, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8,721. The legislation did not subject any of France's
1990]
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The landmark 1979 case of Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltungfir Branntwein76 provides a useful
introduction to EC Article 36 case law. In Rewe-Zentral AG,
West Germany refused to permit the importation of certain po-
table spirits, including the liqueur "Cassis de Dijon." The li-
queur contained less than the minimum alcohol percentage
mandated by West German regulations.78 The importer, Rewe-
Zentral AG, argued that the barrier made well-known spirits
from other Member States unmarketable in West Germany and
was tantamount to a quantitative restriction on imports con-
trary to Article 30.79 Germany replied that its composition
rules protected the health of German consumers and shielded
natural sweet wines to any advertising restrictions, but did impose a system of
advertising restrictions on imported natural sweet wines, liqueur wines, and
certain rums and spirits. Id. at 2313, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8,721.
In defense of its legislation, the French government argued that it applied
to some nationally produced goods, did not discriminate in favor of French
products, and was designed solely to protect the health of the public. Id at
2314, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8,271. Accord-
ing to the French government, the legislation promoted these goals by distin-
guishing between aperitifs and drinks consumed for "digestive" purposes, the
former being more dangerous to public health because aperitifs are taken on
an empty stomach. Id at 2315, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) at 8,272. Although France may have advanced this argument with
great sincerity, it appears that it did not actually believe that the use of aperi-
tifs posed a threat to the health of humans, animals, or plants, but instead to
the health of French alcohol producers.
The European Court of Justice rejected the French government's argu-
ments and stated that the legislation impermissibly placed imported products
at a disadvantage compared to domestic products. Id at 2316-17, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mikt. Rep. (CCH) at 8,273. The Court held that leg-
islation restricting the advertising of alcoholic beverages would comply with
Article 36 only if the rules were applied in a manner that equally affected
both domestic and imported alcoholic beverages. Id
76. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8543.
77. Id. at 651, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,779.
78. Id. The German government stated that spirits containing low
volumes of alcohol were more likely to induce a tolerance towards alcohol
than spirits containing higher volumes of alcohol. Id. at 663, [1978-1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7,787. Germany also argued that the
lower alcohol content of the foreign beverages subjected them to less taxation,
which secured a competitive advantage for the foreign producers over Ger-
man-produced beverages. Id.
79. Id. at 652, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,781.
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them from unfair commercial practices80 The European Court
of Justice rejected this claim, ruling that the composition rules
had not, in fact, been established or applied to protect consum-
ers.81 The Court stated that the low alcohol liqueur posed no
health risk as German consumers regularly dilute their high al-
cohol volume beverages and that, moreover, labeling require-
ments would have adequately protected German consumers.
8 2
Rewe-Zentral AG provided the foundation for modern EC
free trade jurisprudence. It nonetheless left many questions
unanswered. Rewe-Zentral AG was essentially a pretext case.
The European Court of Justice found that West Germany's
avowed health concerns were merely pretexts to shroud Ger-
many's enactment of protectionist legislation.83 The case left
open the question of the proper approach to disputes involving
burdensome technical trade obstacles that are based on argua-
bly legitimate concerns for 'the health of the citizens of the reg-
ulating Member State.84 Following Rewe-Zentral AG, EC case
law has evolved on this issue. The European Court of Justice
has gradually begun to require regulating states to prove that a
restrictive trade regulation is justified, such as being necessary
to protect the life or health of humans or animals.
The European Court of Justice initially placed the burden
of proof on the importer. In the 1983 case of Criminal proceed-
ings against Sandoz BV,85 for example, the Court evaluated an
arguably legitimate health-related obstacle. In Sandoz BV, a
Danish magistrate8 6 charged Sandoz BV with selling and mar-
keting, without governmental authorization, food to which vita-
80. Id at 663, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,787.
81. See i-i (the protection of human health cannot justify the fixing of a
minimum wine-spirit content for potable spirits).
82. See i& at 663-64, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 7,787 (holding that the fixing of a minimum alcohol content for alco-
holic beverages intended for human consumption by the legislation of a Mem-
ber State falls within the Article 30 prohibition of measures having an effect
equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports).
83. Id. at 664, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,787.
84. Cf i& at 663, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
at 7,787 (by finding that the German legislation was designed to protect the
German spirits industry, and not the health of German consumers, the court
was able to reach its decision without addressing whether it would allow a na-
tion to impose technical trade obstacles that are designed to protect the health
of the public).
85. 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2445, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,006.
86. The Danish magistrate's title was the "Economische Politierechter"
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mins had been added. 7 The Danish government argued that
consumption of such food was dangerous as consumers might
be lulled into believing that excessive or prolonged consump-
tion of such vitamin-enriched foodstuffs posed no risk, and
could even be beneficial, to the health of the unwary user.Pa
The EC Commission countered that the nondiscriminatory
trade obstacle should be removed as the vitamins were not in
themselves a danger to human health.89 The European Court
of Justice upheld the Danish regulations on the grounds that
importer Sandoz BV could not conclusively guarantee the
safety of the imported foodstuffs90 Thus, the Court required
the importer to prove a negative: that the foodstuffs were not
dangerous; that they were absolutely safe in every respect.9 '
Over time, however, the European Court of Justice real-
ized that it was more reasonable, and rational, to require the
regulating state to demonstrate that a product was not safe if
(magistrate dealing with commercial offenses). I&. at 2447, [1983-1985 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 14,083.
87. Id.
88. See iE. at 2457, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII)
at 14,089 (Denmark argued that intoxication may result from the absorption of
Vitamins A, B, C, and D in abnormal quantities or over a prolonged period and
that consumer reliance on enriched foodstuffs actually may result in an im-
proper diet).
89. I1& at 2457, 2459, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 14,090, 14,091. The European Court of Justice observed that
although excessive consumption of certain vitamins may be unhealthy, scien-
tific research established objective and internationally recognized criteria for
use in determining what levels of ingestion are safe for different vitamins. Id.
at 2449, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 14,084. Con-
sumption of the Sandoz BV products could not lead to intoxication because a
person would have to consume more food than he or she would be capable of
digesting. I& at 2449-50, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 14,084.
90. Id. at 2460, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
14,092.
91. Id. at 2461, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
14,093; see also i&. at 2462-63, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 14,093 (holding that when scientific research is inconclusive in deter-
mining the product's safety, Member States, in the absence of harmonization,
must decide to what degree they intend to assure the protection of the health
and life of humans, although these States must have regard for the overriding
interests of maintaining intra-European Community free trade). Animal stud-
ies are used to determine the safety of a variety of foodstuffs destined for con-
sumption by consumers. Comment, supra note 2, at 149. It is unclear whether
consumers can confidently rely upon the data produced by such studies. Id, at
150 (citing COMmrrrFE FOR A STUDY ON SACCHARIN AND FOOD SAFETY POLCY,
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL/ASSEMBLY OF
LIFE SCIENCES, FOOD SAFETY POLICY: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS Part 2, 5-23 (1979)).
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that state wished to impede the free flow of goods within the
EC. Four years after Sandoz BV, the European Court of Jus-
tice decided the Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany92
and Commission v. Hellenic Republic93 (German and Greek
beer) cases. In these cases, the Court clearly announced a new
standard for Article 36 cases: The regulating Member State
would bear the burden of proving that its trade barriers were
not unnecessary obstacles to trade.94 The German and Greek
beer cases involved facially neutral legislation enacted by West
Germany and Greece that required both domestic and imported
beer to conform to a set of stringent traditional domestic purity
standards. 95 Despite German and Greek arguments to the con-
trary,96 the EC Commission argued that Article 36 did not pro-
tect the obstacles because the two nations could not prove that
the protection of human life or health justified the prohibi-
tions.97 In ruling that the obstacles were unreasonable and con-
92. 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1227, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,417.
93. 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1193, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,418.
94. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1221, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,922; Federal Republic of
Germany, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1272, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,908.
95. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1197-98, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,913; Federal Republic of
Germany, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1264, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,904. Both the Greek and German legislation pro-
vided that producers of bottom-fermented beers could only be manufactured
using malted barley, hops, yeast, and water. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. at 1197-98, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
at 17,913; Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1264,
[1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,904. Under the
German legislation, top-fermented beer could also contain other malts, sugars,
and colorants. I&
96. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1221, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,922; Federal Republic of
Germany, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 126, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,905. Germany argued that its legislation was nec-
essary to protect public health and, if beer was manufactured using only the
raw materials listed in the legislation, the use of additives could be avoided.
I&i Similarly, Greece argued that the long-term effects of the additives could
be dangerous. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1221, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 17,922. Because additives and en-
zymes were not technologically necessary when beer was manufactured using
only the raw materials prescribed in the Greek legislation, Greece argued that
it needed to preclude the use of such additives and enzymes in the manufac-
ture of beer. I&i
97. Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1216, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,920; Federal Republic of
19Wo]
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trary to Article 30, the European Court of Justice affirmed that
general prohibitions are impermissible unless the regulating
nation proves that a product is dangerous to legitimate national
interests, such as the health of the citizenry.98 The German
and Greek beer cases thus preclude a Member State from re-
stricting the importing of lawfully marketed products unless
the State can prove that the product is dangerous.
The German and Greek beer cases establish that the bur-
den of proof rests with the regulating nation in internal EC
trade disputes. The standard of review in such disputes, how-
ever, remained unclear until the 1979 case of Commission v.
Federal Republic of Germany.99 West German legislation re-
quired that all imported meat products be processed in a gov-
ernment-approved establishment located in the country where
the animals were actually slaughtered.100 West Germany ar-
gued that this regulation was intended to eliminate the risk
that the slaughtering of the animals occurred in unsanitary fa-
cilities located outside of the EC. 10 '
The European Court of Justice rejected the German regu-
lation.10 2 The Court stated that Article 36 allows restrictive
measures to derogate from the fundamental principal of free
trade only to the extent that the measures are necessary to ef-
fectuate the legitimate purposes of the regulating nation.10 3 In
this case, however, the Court held that the German regulations
Germany, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1266-67, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,905.
98. See Hellenic Republic, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1225, [1986-1988
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 17,924 (holding that "by
prohibiting the marketing of beers lawfully manufactured and marketed in an-
other Member State if they do not comply with the requirements laid down in
the Greek legislation, the Hellenic Republic has failed to, fulfill its obligations
under Article 30 of the Treaty [of Rome]"); Federal Republic of Germany, 1987
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1277, [1986-1988 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) at 17,910 (holding that '%y prohibiting the marketing of beers lawfully
manufactured and marketed in another Member State if they do not comply
with [the German legislation], the Federal Republic of Germany has failed to
fulfil its obligations under Article 30 of the Treaty [of Rome]").
99. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2555, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8,601.
100. Id. at 2557, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,104.
101. I& at 2565, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep, (CCH) at
7,105.
102. I& at 2568, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,105.
103. Id. at 2564, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,105.
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were excessive in relation to their stated objective'"° because
Germany could have achieved its stated goals by the far less
burdensome requirement that meat importers provide German
customs agents with proof that the animals had been killed in a
slaughterhouse that a Member State had previously approved
as sanitary.1 5
The Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany case re-
flects reasoning similar to the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Dean Milk v. City of Madison.i 0 Dean Milk illus-
trates the onerous requirements placed on states to justify even
legitimate reasons for imposing burdens upon interstate
trade.107 The United States Supreme Court's use of the "no
less burdensome alternative" standard inevitably leads to the
subjugation of state sovereignty interests in favor of a more
unified and uniform national economylca In following the
Dean Milk reasoning, the EC, as an emerging superstate, strove
to create a similar bias to ensure that its Member States were
free only to create the least restrictive, necessary obstacles to
intra-European Community trade109
III. A STANDARDS CODE FREE TRADE
BALANCING TEST
The GATT Standards Code prohibits "unnecessary" techni-
104. I& at 2567, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,105.
105. Id. at 2566, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at
7,105. The European Court of Justice determined, however, that Germany
would violate Article 30 if it continued to require that processing take place
within the borders of the Member State in which the animal was slaughtered.
I& at 2568, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7,105.
Germany argued unsuccessfully that such measures were required to prevent
the importation of pork that was contaminated by the organism trichinae. I&
at 2567, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 7,105. The
Court determined that there was no proof that the incidence of trichinae in
meat products increased simply due to the fact that fresh meat had crossed a
border prior to the processing stage, or to accept that such a border crossing
made it more difficult or less reliable to detect which imported meat products
contained trichinae. I
106. See suprm notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
107. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951).
108. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (the European Court of
Justice's application of the 1957 Treaty of Rome has facilitated the EC's trans-
formation into a superstate, which will unify the economic and political sys-
tems of much of Europe and remove intra-European Community obstacles to
trade).
109. See supra notes 76-105 and accompanying text (tracing the evolution
of EC Article 36 case law).
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cal obstacles to trade.11 0 The Code's use of the word "unneces-
sary" at least implicitly requires the analyst to use a free trade
balancing test to determine whether the technical obstacle to
trade creates an unnecessary burden on trade. Unfortunately,
the Code does not provide its adjudicatory panelists with a
framework for determining if a facially neutral regulation is an
unnecessary obstacle to trade."' Such a framework is needed if
Standards Code analysts are to resolve complicated trade dis-
putes such as the BST controversy. This Note proposes an ana-
lytical framework by drawing upon the balancing test
principles enunciated in United States and EC internal free
trade jurisprudence.
United States and EC jurisprudence require the nation that
imposes a trade obstacle to prove that the barrier has a net ben-
efit to world trade.- 2 Such measures have a net benefit if they
serve the public interest in safety, quality, or effectiveness, and
use narrowly tailored measures to effectuate legitimate pur-
poses.1 3 Applying this framework to the BST trade dispute
demonstrates that the EC's ban is an unnecessary technical ob-
stacle to trade and therefore violative of the GATT Standards
Code." 4
A. SHFrING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The first issue in determining a GATT Standards Code an-
alytical framework is re-evaluating the allocation of the burden
of proof in Standards Code adjudication. Unlike United
States 15 and EC" 6 case law, both of which assign the burden of
proof to the regulating nation, the Code assigns the burden of
proof to the non-regulating party."17 To be successful under
Code litigation, the non-regulating party must prove either that
the actions of the regulating state were deliberately protection-
ist or that the trade barrier cannot be justified as necessary." 8
In the BST dispute, the United States would bear the unenvi-
able task of attempting to prove a negative: that the ban is
without foundation and that it therefore functions as an unnec-
110. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 64, 72-75 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 64, 72-105 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
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essary obstacle to trade.n 9
The inherent problem with the Standards Code burden of
proof is that the non-regulating party must prove a negative.
When regulating nations argue that the imposition of technical
barriers are justified on the grounds that they are necessary to
protect human health or life, the non-regulating nation must
counter by conclusively demonstrating that the restricted prod-
uct is perfectly safe. 20 Herein lies the crux of the problem: An
exporting state can rarely, if ever, guarantee that the consump-
tion of a particular foodstuff poses absolutely no risk to the
health of the importing nation's consumers.
The different political structures within the EC, the United
States, and the GAWT reflect the differing allocations of the
burden of proof within these respective coalitions. The United
States functions as one nation and, in matters that relate to in-
terstate commerce, federal law controls over state law inconsis-
tent with it.'21 A similar subjugation of state powers is rapidly
emerging within the EC2 2 as the European Court of Justice
now places the burden of proof upon Member States that at-
tempt to rely on Article 36 exceptions.2 -
In contrast to the United States and EC political structure,
the GAI is a large, informal organization.124 The GAT has
more experience in assisting its signatories reach voluntary set-
tlements than in enforcing its infrequent rulings.25 Ostensibly,
119. See Standards Code, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 414,1186
U.N.T.S. at 278-80.
120. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. It may be impossible to
prove that a product such as BST poses absolutely no risk to national interests
because the science of biotechnology is so new that researchers do not know
what hazards to look for when screening food and, further, conducting such
exhaustive tests would cost billions of dollars, crippling the biotechnology in-
dustry. Schmickle, supra note 14, at 6A, col. 1; c. Comment, supra note 2, at
149-50 (it is very unclear whether consumers can confidently rely upon the
data produced by animal studies that are used to determine the safety of a va-
riety of foodstuffs destined for consumption by consumers).
121. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (the United States Supreme
Court has applied the United States commerce clause to prevent any state
from successfully gaining an economic advantage at the expense of another
state).
122. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (the EC is evolving into
a superstate that will unify the economic and political systems of much of Eu-
rope and remove intra-European Community obstacles to trade).
123. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note I and accompanying text.
125. Contracting Parties filed 82 legal complaints in the three decades after
the GAT T's 1947 inception. Hudec, supra note 26, at 1456 n.44. An additional
83 complaints were filed in the fourth decade. Id Most complaints were vol-
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the GATT strives to create free trade,'2 a goal that it shares
with the internal trade policies of the United States'2 and the
EC.128 Yet the GATT's loose and informal structure is not con-
ducive to the accomplishment of this grand objective. Thus, it
may be unrealistic to expect that the signatories to the GATT
Standards Code will become willing to adopt the United States
untarily settled through negotiation. Hudec, supra note 43, at 214. Com-
plaining parties reported a satisfactory solution to approximately 80% of the 82
initial complaints. Id.
126. The preamble to the GATr provides that the Contracting Parties
agreed to the GATT provisions:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic en-
deavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of liv-
ing, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use
of the resources of the world and expanding the production and ex-
change of goods, [and] [b]eing desirous of contributing to these objec-
tives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment
in international commerce ....
GATT, BAsIC INsTUMENTS, supra note 2, preamble, at 1 (emphasis added).
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the GATT Standards Code reads, in part, as follows:
"Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards are not pre-
pared, adopted or applied with a view to creating obstacles to international
trade.... [Parties] shall likewise ensure that neither technical regulations nor
standards themselves nor their application have the effect of creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade." Standards Code, supra note 2, art. 2,
para. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 414, 1186 U.N.T.S. at 278-80.
127. The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power to regu-
late commerce. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Although states may enact legis-
lation that regulates commerce, such laws generally may not create obstacles
to interstate trade:
[W]hen a state regulation conflicts with federal legislation enacted
under the commerce clause, the federal statute controls pursuant to
the supremacy clause.... [Tihe rationale of the commerce clause was
to create and foster the development of a common market among the
states, eradicating internal trade barriers, and prohibiting the eco-
nomic Balkanization of the Union.... When local legislation thwarts
the operation of the common market of the United States, the local
laws have then exceeded the permissible limits of the.., commerce
clause.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 55, § 8.1, at 260, 262.
128. The EC Treaty of Rome prevents Member States from imposing quo-
tas on goods that are lawfully produced or marketed in other EC Member
States. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 30, at 244. Article 30 provides that
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent ef-
fect shall ... be prohibited between Member States." Id.; see also Criminal
proceedings against Sandoz BV, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2445, 2460, [1983-
1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,006, at 14,091 (the Euro-
pean Court of Justice regards all commercial rules likely to impede intra-Eu-
ropean Community trade as measures that are equivalent to prohibited
quantitative restrictions).
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or the EC allocation of the burden of proof.129
Nonetheless, to resolve the dilemma created by forcing the
non-regulating party to prove a negative, the GAIT Standards
Code should shift to the regulating nation the burden of prov-
ing that a trade barrier is justified. Such a shift of the burden
of proof would result in a far more reasonable requirement
than the present system, which places the onerous burden of
proving a negative upon the non-regulating party.30
B. OBSTACLES MUST SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SAFETY,
QUALITY, OR EFFEcrvENEss
EC officials fear that wide-scale use of BST could exacer-
bate the already serious surplus of dairy products within the
EC and force smaller EC dairy producers out of business.' 3 '
Not surprisingly, the EC believes that it must protect the liveli-
hoods of its small dairy producers by prohibiting the importa-
tion of dairy products produced with the aid of BST. i32 The
EC's concerns are understandable. Yet the question remains
whether these concerns can support the drastic measure of im-
posing a complete ban on the domestic production and importa-
tion of dairy products produced with the aid of BST. Quite
simply, the socioeconomic concerns of the EC should not be rel-
evant in determining whether the ban violates the Standards
Code."am Under the Code, the only criteria that a signatory can
justifiably utilize in imposing a quantitative trade restriction
are those that relate to safety, quality, or effectiveness.'i 4
The EC's invocation of socioeconomic concerns is entirely
inconsistent with the GATT's avowed purpose of promoting
world-wide free trade1 a5 The signatories have agreed to be
bound by the GATT and the Standards Code not to protect
inefficient producers, but to raise living standards, ensure full
employment, increase real income, develop the full use of re-
sources of the world, and expand the production and exchange
129. Cf Petersmann, The EC as a GA2Y Member - Legal Conflicts Be-
tween GATT Law and European Community Law, in 4 THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNrrY AND THE GATT 23, 59 (1986).
130. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
133. Id- (the EC is using a new socioeconomic criterion as its primary justi-
fication for its ban on BST, even though safety, quality, and effectiveness are
the three traditional criteria used to judge veterinary substances for use in
livestock).
134. IA.
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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of goods.1 3 Although the EC's interests in maintaining em-
ployment could be benefited if the United States were to accede
to the use of the socioeconomic criterion as a basis for restrict-
ing free trade,1s7 such benefits would pale beside the resulting
burdens on international trade. Any benefits in employment
would largely accrue only to those industries targeted for gov-
ernment favors."s The greater burden of reduced access to for-
eign markets would be felt across the world.' s  GAIT
acceptance of protectionist trade restrictions would most cer-
tainly lead to a series of retaliatory technical trade barriers,
further reducing world living standards.140 Thus, Standards
Code panelists should reject the EC's use of the socioeconomic
criterion in its attempt to ban the sale of dairy products pro-
duced with the aid of BST.
C. LEGISLATION MUST EMPLOY MOST NARROWLY TAILORED
MEANS TO EFFECTUATE THE OBSTACLE'S LEGITIMATE
PURPOSES
Even if a state imposes a trade regulation for legitimate
purposes, United States and EC jurisprudence demonstrate that
a regulating state must prove that the obstacle to trade employs
the most narrowly tailored means to effectuate the barrier's le-
gitimate purposes.141 The United States Supreme Court, as the
Dean Milk case demonstrates, hardly hesitates to limit the nar-
row state powers to regulate interstate commerce when the
Court believes that the state can effectuate its interests with
less disruption to interstate commerce.142 Likewise, in Federal
Republic of Germany, the European Court of Justice struck
down German trade restrictions, ruling that Germany could ad-
136. See supra note 126.
137. V. CANTO, THE DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE RE-
STRICTIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 146-51 (1986).
138. Id
139. Cf. id at 143 (a decline in stock indices occurs in anticipation of forth-
coming trade restrictions).
140. The rise of protectionist policies is linked to the concern for the inter-
national competitiveness of products produced in the United States. Id. at 2.
Empirical evidence indicates that trade restrictions, even if designed to im-
prove the domestic economy and protect selected industries, can impoverish
domestic and foreign producers and consumers. Id at 2, 135-51. As economist
Paul Samuelson explains: "Free [or freer] trade promotes a mutually profita-
ble intentional division of labor, greatly enhances the potential real national
product of all nations, and makes possible higher standards of living all over
the globe." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 651 (11th ed. 1980).
141. See supra notes 56-64, 100-05 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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dress its purported health and safety concern in a manner far
less detrimental to international trade.14
Standards Code analysts should adopt the EC Treaty of
Rome and United States commerce clause balancing tests that,
in part, require technical barriers to trade to be narrowly tai-
lored. Analysts applying a similar test to the BST dispute
would find that the ban is not narrowly tailored to effectuate
the EC's asserted interests.1' Even if one accepts the premise
that BST poses a health risk, a total ban is not narrowly tai-
lored. The EC could protect its residents through less onerous
regulations. For example, the EC could subject domestically
produced and imported milk to analysis.14 Should future re-
search indicate that milk becomes dangerous when BST resi-
dues exceed some level, the EC could prohibit the consumption
and importation of milk that contains an unsafe level of BST.
D. APPLYING THE _NALYTIcAL FRAmEwORK TO THE BST
DISPUTE
The proposed framework requires the Standards Code ana-
lyst to apply a free trade balancing test to determine if the ben-
efits to the regulating nation of a technical obstacle to trade
outweigh its costs to international trade.146 A technical obsta-
cle to trade has a net benefit if it serves the public interest in
safety, quality, or effectiveness, and uses narrowly tailored
measures to effectuate the obstacle's legitimate purposes.-47
The EC's ban on BST fails this proposed free trade balanc-
ing test.148 The EC's socioeconomic concerns should not be rel-
evant in determining whether the ban violates the Standards
Code. The BST ban does not serve the public interest in safety,
quality, or effectiveness and, therefore, fails the first part of the
balancing test. Furthermore, even if one accepts the EC's as-
sertions that BST poses a health risk, a total ban is not nar-
rowly tailored: The EC could less onerously protect its
143. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
144. See supz notes 16-20 and accompanying text (although the EC Com-
mission has claimed that the ban is necessary to provide it with time to imple-
ment regulations governing the authorization of substances such as BST, its
real concerns are that some farmers will use BST to increase their yields and
profits, exacerbate the surplus of dairy products produced by EC farmers, and
force more inefficient EC farmers out of business).
145. See supra note 91 (animal studies are already used, albeit perhaps un-
reliably, to test the safety of foodstuffs).
146. See supra notes 64, 72-75 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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residents by prohibiting the consumption and importation of all
milk that contains more than a safe level of the naturally oc-
curring BST.
CONCLUSION
The GATT Standards Code provides that its signatories,
which include both the EC and the United States, may not en-
act a technical regulation that creates, in the words of the Code,
"an unnecessary obstacle to international trade." The ongoing
dispute between the EC and the United States over the applica-
tion of the Code to dairy products produced with the aid of BST
illustrates that the Code neither defines the term "unneces-
sary," nor provides its adjudicatory analysts with a framework
for determining when a technical obstacle to trade is unneces-
sary and thus impermissible.
This Note crafts a Standards Code balancing test for evalu-
ating these technical barriers by examining how analogous dis-
putes are resolved under United States commerce clause and
EC Treaty of Rome jurisprudence. The test requires Code ana-
lysts to weigh the benefits to the regulating nation of a techni-
cal obstacle to trade against the costs from the increased
barriers to international trade. A technical obstacle to trade
has a net benefit if it serves the public interest in safety, qual-
ity, or effectiveness, and uses narrowly tailored measures to ef-
fectuate its legitimate purposes. This balancing test should
serve as a model framework for Standards Code adjudication.
The test will help to provide Code analysts with a consistent
and rational determination of what technical obstacles should
be defined as "unnecessary," and thus impermissible, under the
GATT Standards Code.
Steven J Rothberg
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